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ABSTRACT
As a warm-blooded mammalian species, we humans routinely leave
thermal residues on various objects with which we come in contact.
This includes common input devices, such as keyboards, that are
used for entering (among other things) secret information, such
as passwords and PINs. Although thermal residue dissipates over
time, there is always a certain time window during which thermal
energy readings can be harvested from input devices to recover
recently entered, and potentially sensitive, information.
To-date, there has been no systematic investigation of thermal
profiles of keyboards, and thus no efforts have been made to se-
cure them. This serves as our main motivation for constructing a
means for password harvesting from keyboard thermal emanations.
Specifically, we introduce Thermanator, a new post factum insider
attack based on heat transfer caused by a user typing a password
on a typical external keyboard. We conduct and describe a user
study that collected thermal residues from 30 users entering 10
unique passwords (both weak and strong) on 4 popular commod-
ity keyboards. Results show that entire sets of key-presses can be
recovered by non-expert users as late as 30 seconds after initial
password entry, while partial sets can be recovered as late as 1
minute after entry. Furthermore, we find that Hunt-and-Peck typ-
ists are particularly vulnerable. We also discuss some Thermanator
mitigation strategies.
The main take-away of this work is three-fold: (1) using external
keyboards to enter (already much-maligned) passwords is even
less secure than previously recognized, (2) post factum (planned
or impromptu) thermal imaging attacks are realistic, and finally
(3) perhaps it is time to either stop using keyboards for password
entry, or abandon passwords altogether.
1 INTRODUCTION
Insider attacks are very common, estimated to account for ≈28%
of all electronic crimes in industry [13]. This includes some high-
profile attacks, such as the 2014 Sony hack [20]. At the same time, it
is well known that security of a system is based on its weakest link.
Furthermore, it is often assumed that involvement of a fallible (or
simply gullible) human user corresponds to this weakest link, e.g.,
as in Shoulder-Surfing and Lunch-Time attacks. However, other
insider attacks that focus on stealing passwords by compromising
the user environment, e.g., Acoustic Emanations [3, 8, 28] or Key-
board Vibrations [17], show that the weakest link is a consequence
of a law of Physics. However, such insider attacks must occur in-
stantaneously, in real time, in order to succeed. In other words, to
exploit them, the adversary must be able to record the environment
as the user is entering a password. Real-time adversarial presence
(whether in person or via a nearby compromised recording device)
raises the bar for the attack. This prompts the question:
Are there any observable physical effects of password entry that linger
and can therefore be collected afterwards?
1.1 Heat Transfer & Thermal Emanations
Any time two objects with unequal temperatures come in contact
with each other, an exchange of heat occurs. This is unavoidable.
Being warm-blooded, human beings naturally prefer environments
that are colder than their internal temperature. Because of this
heat disparity, it is inevitable that we leave thermal residue on
numerous objects that we routinely touch, especially, withwith bare
fingers. Furthermore, it takes time for these heated objects to cool
off and lose heat energy imparted by human contact. It is both not
surprising and worrisome that this includes our interactions with
keyboards that are used for entering sensitive private information,
such as passwords.
Based on this observation, we consider a mostly unexplored
attack space where heat transfer and subsequent thermal residue
can be exploited by a clever adversary to steal passwords from
a keyboard some time after it was used for password entry. The
main distinctive benefit of this attack type is that adversary’s real
time presence is not required. Instead, a successful attack can occur
with after-the-fact adversarial presence: as our results show, many
seconds later.
While there has been some prior work on using thermal em-
anations to crack PINs, mobile phone screen-locks and opening
combinations of vaults/safes [1, 2, 14, 26], this work represents the
first comprehensive investigation of human-based thermal residues
and emanations of external computer keyboards.
1.2 Expected Contributions
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a particular human-based
side-channel attack class, called Thermanator. This attack class is
based on exploiting thermal residues left behind by a user (victim)
who enters a password using a typical external keyboard. Shortly
after password entry, the victim either steps away inadvertently, or
is drawn away (perhaps as a result of being prompted by the adver-
sary) from the personal workplace. Then, the adversary captures
thermal images of the victim keyboard. We examine the efficacy
of Thermanator Attacks for a moderately sophisticated adversary
equipped with a mid-range thermal imaging camera. The goal of
the attack is to learn information about the victim password.
To confirm viability of Thermanator Attacks, we conducted a
rigorous two-stage user study. The first stage collected password
entry data from 31 subjects using 4 common keyboards. In the sec-
ond stage, 8 non-expert subjects acted as adversaries and attempted
to derive the set of pressed keys from the thermal imaging data
collected in the first stage. Our results show that even novice ad-
versaries can use thermal residues to reliably determine the entire
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set of key-presses up to 30 seconds after password entry. Further-
more, they can determine a partial set of key-presses as long as a
full minute after password entry. We provide a thorough discussion
of the implications of this study, and mitigation techniques against
Thermanator Attacks.
Furthermore, in the course of exploring Thermanator Attacks,
we introduce a new post factum adversarial model. We compre-
hensively compare this model with those of other insider attacks
that target user behavior and physical properties, such as Lunch-
Time, Shoulder-Surfing, and Acoustic Emanations attacks. In doing
so, we focus on attack characteristics, such as: goals, timeline and
equipment required by the adversary.
1.3 Organization
Section 2 provides background on thermodynamic concepts, mod-
ern keyboards and thermal cameras. Section 3 describes assumed
Thermanator Attacks and adversarial models. Section 4 describes
our methodology, apparatus and subject recruitment. Study results
are presented in Section 5 and their implications are discussed in
Section 6. We then compare and contrast Thermanator with other
insider attacks in Section 7. Section 8 discusses related work. We
conclude the paper with directions for future work in Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we provide some background material on physical
interactions that describe thermal phenomena observed in our ex-
periments. We start with a glossary of terms, then describe the form
factor and material composition of modern 104-key "Windows" key-
boards and finish with certain Physics concepts used in the rest
of the paper. Given familiarity with elements of Conductive Heat
Transfer and Newton’s Law of Cooling, Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3
can be skipped with no loss of continuity.
2.1 Basic Thermal Terminology
• Joule (J) - Unit of energy Corresponding to 1 Newton-Meter
(Nm )• Kelvin (K ) – Base unit of temperature in Physics. The temper-
ature T in Kelvin (K) minus 273.15 yields the corresponding
temperature in degrees Celsius (◦C).
• Watt (W) – Unit of work corresponding to 1 Joule-Second:
( Js )• Conduction – Transfer of Thermal Energy caused by two
objects in physical contact that are at different Temperatures.
• Convection – Transfer of Thermal Energy caused by sub-
merging an object in a fluid.
• Heat Transfer Coefficient - Property of a fluid that deter-
mines rate of convective heat flow. Expressed in Watts per
square meter Kelvin: Wm2K• Specific Heat – Amount of Thermal Energy in Joules that
it takes to increase temperature of 1kg of material by 1K .
Expressed in Joules over kilograms degrees Kelvin: JkдK .
• Thermal Conductivity – Rate at which Thermal Energy
passes through a material. Expressed in Watts per meters
Kelvin: WmK• Thermal Energy – Latent energy stored in an object due to
heat flowing into it.
• Thermal Source – Object or material that can internally
generate Thermal Energy such that it can stay at constant
temperature during a thermal interaction, e.g., a heat pump.
2.2 Heating via Thermal Conduction
Thermal Conduction is transfer of heat between any two touching
objects of different temperatures. It is expressed as the movement of
heat energy from the warmer to the cooler object. We are concerned
with transfer of energy from a human fingertip to a pressed keycap.
This transfer is governed by Fourier’s Law of heat conduction which
states that:
Heat transfer between two objects can be modeled by
the equation: q = KA(T1−T2)td , where K is thermal
conductivity1 of the object being heated, A is area of
contact,T1 is initial temperature of the hotter object,T2
is initial temperature of the cooler object, t is time, and
d is the thickness of the object being heated.
The relationship between an object’s heat energy and its tempera-
ture is governed by the object’s mass and specific heat, as dictated
by the formula: q = cm∆T , where q is total heat energy, c is object’s
specific heat,m is object’s mass and ∆T is change in temperature.
We consider the human body to be a thermal source, and we
assume that any change in the fingertip temperature during the
(very short) fingertip-keycap contact period is negligible, due to
internal heat regulation [9]. Furthermore, we assume that:
• Average area of an adult human fingertip is 400mm2 [18].
• Average human skin temperature is 307.15K (= 34◦C) [7].
• Average duration of a key-press is 0.28s [21].
• Keyboard temperature is the same of that as that of the air,
which, for a typical office, is OSHA2-recommended 294.15K
(= 21◦C) [16].
Therefore, for variables mentioned above, we have:
K=0.25, A=0.00024025, T1=34, T2=21, t=0.28, and d=0.0015
Plugging these values into Fourier’s Law, we get:
q =
(0.25)(0.00024025)(34 − 21)(.28)
0.0015
which yields total energy transfer: q = 0.1458J. We then use total
energy q in the specific heat equation to determine total tempera-
ture change: 0.1458 = (1000)(0.0004716)∆T . This gives us a total
temperature change of ∆T = 0.3092. Therefore, we conclude that
the average human fingertip touching a keycap at the average room
temperature results in the keycap heating up by 0.3092K .
2.3 Cooling via Thermal Convection
After a keycap heats up as a result of conduction caused by a
press by a warm(er) human finger, it begins to cool off due to
convective heat transfer with the air in the room. Convection is
defined as the transfer of heat resulting from the internal current of
a fluid, which moves hot (and less dense) particles upward, and cold
(and denser) particles – downward. This interaction is governed
by Newton’s Law of Cooling. Its particulars are impacted by the
shape and position of the heated object. In our case, there is a plane
1K should not be confused with K – degrees Kelvin.
2OSHA = Occupational Safety and Hazards Administration, a United States federal
agency.
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surface3 facing towards the cooling fluid (i.e., a keycap directly
exposed to ambient air) which is described by the formula:
T (t) = Ts + (T0 −Ts )e−κt
where T (t) is temperature at time t , Ts is temperature of ambient
air, T0 is initial object temperature, and κ is the cooling constant of
still (non-turbulent) air over a 0.00024025m2 plane.
This comeswith the additional intuitive notion that a surface con-
vectively cools quicker when the temperature difference between
the heated object and the fluid is higher. Similarly, it cools slower
when the temperature difference is smaller. Finally, Newton’s Law
of Cooling is asymptotic, and cannot be used to find the time at
which the object reaches the exact temperature of the ambient fluid.
Thus, instead of finding the time when the temperatures are equal,
we determine the time when the temperature difference falls below
an acceptable threshold, which we set at 0.04K . Plugging this into
Newton’s Law of Cooling results in:
t = − ln(
0.3092
0.04 )
0.037
which yields t = 55.7 for total time for a pressed key to cool down
to the point where it is indistinguishable from room temperature.
2.4 Modern Keyboards
Most commodity external keyboard models are of the 104-key "Win-
dows" variety, shown in Figure 1. On such keyboards, the distance
between centers of adjacent keys is about 19.05mm, and a typical
keycap shape is an ≈ [15.5mm x 15.5mm x 1.5mm] rectangular
prism, with an average travel distance of 3.55mm [15]; see Figure
3. All such keyboards are constructed out of Polybutylene Tereph-
thalate (PBT) with density of 1.31д/cm3 , resulting in an average
keycap mass of .4716д [19]. PBT generally has the following char-
acteristics: specific heat = 1, 000 JkдK and thermal conductivity =
0.274 WmK [19].
Figure 1: Typical "Windows"-style Keyboard.
2.5 Thermal Cameras
In the past few years, many niche computational and sensing de-
vices have moved from Hollywood-style fantasy into reality. This
includes thermal imagers or cameras. In order to clarify their avail-
ability to individuals (or agencies) at different levels of sophistica-
tion, we provide the following brief comparison of several types of
3The actual keycap surface can be slightly concave.
Figure 2: Typical Keycap Profile.
readily-available FLIR: Forward-Looking Infra-Red devices. (See:
https://www.flir.com/products for full product specifications.) In
the rest of the paper, we use the following terms interchangeably:
FLIR device, thermal imager and thermal camera.
Figure 3: FLIR Devices / Thermal Imagers: TG165(top left,)
SC620(top right,) A6700sc (bottom left,) and X8500sc (bottom right).
TG165 – Price: About US$300. Thermal Sensitivity: 0.15K. Thermal
Accuracy: ±1.5K or 1.5% of reading. Resolution:50x80. Image
Capture: Manual, 1 image at a time. Video Capture: None
SC620 – Price: About US$1500 (used). Thermal Sensitivity: 0.04K
Thermal Accuracy:±2Kor 2% of reading. Resolution: 640x480.
Image Capture: Automatic, programmable to capture images
by timer, or when specific criteria are met, at maximum rate
of 1 image per second. Video Capture: None.
A6700sc – Price: About US$25, 000. Thermal Sensitivity: 0.018K
Thermal Accuracy:±2Kor 2% of reading. Resolution: 640x512.
Image Capture: Automatic, programmable to capture images
by timer or when specific criteria are met, at up to 100fps.
Video Capture: High speed, up to 100fps.
X8500sc – Price: About US$100, 000. Thermal Sensitivity: 0.02K:
Thermal Accuracy:±2Kor 2% of reading. Resolution: 1280x1024
Image Capture: Automatic, programmable to capture images
by timer or when specific criteria are met, at up to 180fps.
Video Capture: High speed, up to 180fps.
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Obviously, a sufficiently motivated organization or a nation-state
could easily obtain thermal imagers of the highest quality (and
price), we assume that the anticipated adversary is of a mid-range
sophistication level, i.e., capable of acquiring a device of the type
exemplified by SC620.
3 ADVERSARIAL MODEL & ATTACKS
This section describes the adversarial model for Thermanator At-
tacks.
3.1 Physical Premise
As mentioned in Section 2, Fourier’s Law states that contact be-
tween any two objects with unequal temperatures results in transfer
of heat energy from the hotter to the cooler object. It is reasonable
to assume that the typical office environment has the ambient tem-
perature within the OSHA-recommended range of 293.15−298.15K
(=20 − 25◦C) [16]. In that setting, the average human hand is ex-
pected to conductively transfer an observable amount of heat to
the ambient-temperature keyboard. Consequently, a bare-fingered
human typist can not avoid leaving thermal residue on a keyboard.
This physical interaction can be abused by the adversary in order
to harvest the thermal residue of a victim who recently used a key-
board to enter potentially sensitive information, e.g., a password.
This forms the premise for Thermanator Attacks.
3.2 Thermanator
Thermanator is a distinct type of insider attack, where a typical
attack scenario proceeds as follows:
STEP 1: The victim uses a keyboard to enter a genuine password,
as part of the log-in (or session unlock) procedure.
STEP 2: Shortly thereafter, the victim either: (1) willingly steps
away, or (2) gets drawn away, from the workplace.
STEP 3: Using thermal imaging (e.g., photos taken by a commodity
FLIR camera) the adversary harvests thermal residues from
the keyboard.
STEP 4: At a later time, the adversary uses the “heat map” of the
images to determine recently pressed keys. This can be done
manually (i.e., via visual inspection) or automatically (i.e.,
via specialized software).
REPEAT: The adversary can choose to repeat STEPS [1-4] over
multiple sessions.
The two options in STEP 2 correspond to two attack sub-types:
opportunistic and orchestrated. In the former, the adversary patiently
waits for the situation described in STEP 2 case (1) to occur. Once
the victim leaves (on their own volition) shortly after password
entry, the adversary swoops in and collects thermal residues. This
strategy is similar to Lunch-Time Attacks. In an orchestrated attack,
instead of waiting for the victim to leave, the adversary uses an
accomplice to draw the victim away shortly after password entry,
as in STEP 2 case (2).
4 METHODOLOGY
In this section we describe of the experimental apparatus, proce-
dures, and subject recruitment methods.
4.1 Apparatus
The experimental setup was designed to simulate a typical office
setting. It was located in a dedicated office in a research building
of a large university. Since experiments were conducted during
the academic year, there was always some (though not excessive)
amount of typical busy office-like ambient noise. Figure 6 shows
the setup from the subject’s perspective. Equipment used in the
experiments consisted of the following readily available (off-the-
shelf) components:
I. FLIR Systems SC620 Thermal Imaging Camera4 This camera
was perched on a tripod 24” above the keyboard.
II. Four popular and inexpensive commodity computer key-
boards: (a) Dell SK-8115, (b) HP SK-2023 (c) Logitech Y-
UM76A, and (d) AZiO Prism KB507. The first (Dell) is shown
in 1 above, and the other three – in Figure 5.
The thermal camera was chosen to be realistic for a moderately
sophisticated and determined adversary. We assume this type of
adversary to be an individual, i.e., not an intelligence agency or a
powerful criminal organization. FLIR SC620 Thermal Imager costs
approximately US$1, 500 used. (This model is about 6-7 years old.)
It automatically records images at the resolution of 640x480 pixels,
with 1Hz frequency. Its thermal sensitivity is 0.04K .
The four keyboards were chosen to cover the typical range of
manufacturers represented in an average workplace. Dell, HP and
Logitech keyboards are popular default keyboards included in new
computer orders from major PC, desktop, and workstation manu-
facturers. Each costs ≈ US$20. Meanwhile, Azio Prism is a popular
low-cost and independently manufactured keyboard that can be
easily obtained on-line e.g., from Amazon; it costs ≈ US$25.
4.2 Procedures
Thermanator was evaluated using a two-stage user study. The first
stage was conducted to collect thermal emanation data, and the
second – to evaluate efficacy of Thermanator Attacks. A given
subject only participated in a single stage.
4.2.1 Stage One: Password Entry. Recall that Thermanator’s goal
is to capture thermal residues of subjects after keyboard password
entry. This is accomplished by FLIR SC620 taking a sequence of
images (60 total), once per second for a total of one minute after
initial password entry. The first stage is shown in Figure 8.
Each subject entered 10 passwords on 4 keyboards and each entry
was followed by one minute of keyboard recording (60 successive
images) by the FLIR. Each subject entered a total of 40 passwords
and every entry took, on average, between 10 and 20 seconds. The
total duration of the experiment for a Stage 1 subject ranged be-
tween 50 and 60 minutes, based on the individual’s typing speed
and style. Both keyboards and passwords were presented to each
subject in random order, in an attempt to negate any side-effects
due to subject training or familiarity with the task.
We selected 10 passwords that included both "insecure" and
"secure" categories. The former passwords were culled from the
top 100 passwords by popularity that adhere to common password
requirements, such as Gmail 5. Whereas, "secure" passwords were
4see: http://www.FLIR.com for a full specification.
5see: https://support.google.com for details
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(a) STEP 1: Victim Enters Password (b) STEP 2: Victim Leaves (c) STEP 3: Thermal Residues Captured
Figure 4: An Example Thermanator Attack
(a) HP SK-2023 (b) Logitech Y-UM76A. (c) AZiO Prism KB507 (backlit).
Figure 5: Keyboards
Figure 6: SC620 Apparatus Setup
created by randomly generating 8-, 10-, and 12-character strings
of lower/uppercase letters as well as numbers and symbols that
adhere to Gmail restrictions. Our selection criteria resulted in the
following 10 candidate passwords:
• [Insecure]: "password", "12345678", "football", "iloveyou",
"12341234", "passw0rd", and "jordan23",
• [Secure]: "jxM#1CT[", "3xZFkMMv|Y", and
"6pl;0>6t(OvF".
4.2.2 Stage Two: Data Inspection. The second stage of the ex-
periment has subjects act as adversaries conducting Thermanator
Attacks. Subjects were shown images obtained from the first stage
Figure 7: Example of Thermal Emanations being Recorded.
of the experiment, e.g., Figure 9, and were instructed to identify the
"lit" regions. Each subject was shown 150 recordings of password
entries in random order. On average, a subject could process a sin-
gle recording in 45− 60 seconds. Total time for each Stage 2 subject
varied in the range of 100 − 130 minutes.
5
Figure 8: Experiment Stage One: Flowchart
Figure 9: Thermal image of "passw0rd" 20seconds after entry.
4.3 Subject Recruitment Procedure
Subjects were recruited from the (student body of a large public
University using a unified Human Subjects Pool designated for
undergraduate volunteers seeking to participate in studies such as
ours. Subjects were compensated with course credit. Because of this,
overwhelming majority of subjects were of college age: 18 − −25.
The subject gender breakdown was: 16 male and 15 female.
All experiments were authorized by the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) of the authors’ employer, well ahead of the commence-
ment of the study. The level of review was: Exempt, Category II.
No sensitive data was collected during the experiments and mini-
mal identifying information was retained. In particular, no subject
names, phone numbers or other personally identifying information
(PII) was collected. All data is stored pseudonymously.
5 RESULTS
We now describe the results of Stage 2 analysis of thermal images
obtained in Stage 1. We divide it into two categories:
• Hunt-and-Peck Typists — ‘those who do not rest their fin-
gertips on, or hover their fingers just over, the home-row of
keys:
• Touch Typists – those whose fingertips routinely hover over,
or lightly touch, the home-row, as shown by Figure 10.
Figure 10: A Touch Typist’s Hands Perched on the Home-Row
As it turns out, our study results indicate that the category of
the typist is the most influential factor for the quality thermal
imaging data. For each category, we separately analyze "secure"
and "insecure" passwords types
For full context, aggregate results (identification rates) from the
entire subject population are shown in Figures 11 and 12; they
correspond to stage 2 subjects’ analysis of "insecure" and "secure"
passwords, respectively. In each graph, "d = 0" refers to average
latest time when stage 2 subjects could correctly identify every
keystroke of the entered password, while "d = 1" denotes average
latest time when subjects could identify all-but-one keystroke, "d
= 2" denotes the average latest time when subjects could identify
all-but-two keystrokes and so on.
Figure 11: ID Rates for All Subjects: "Insecure" Passwords
5.1 Hunt-and-Peck Typists
Our analysis of Hunt-and-Peck typists was straightforward. Be-
cause these typists do not rest their fingertips on (or hover right
above) the keyboard home-row, it is readily apparent that each
6
Figure 12: ID Rates for All Subjects: "Secure" Passwords
bright spot on the thermal image corresponds to a key-press. How-
ever, as discussed below, we encountered some challenges with
"secure" passwords.
Figure 13: ID Rates for Hunt-and-Peck: "Insecure" Passwords
5.1.1 Insecure Passwords. As Figure 13 shows, analysis of Hunt-
and-Peck typists entering "insecure" passwords is straightforward.
In fact, in the best-case of "12341234" subjects could correctly recall
every keystroke, on average, 45.25 seconds after entry. Even the
weakest result, "football" was fully recoverable 25.5 seconds later,
on average. This is in line with conventional thought. Hunt-and-
Peck typists typically only use their forefingers to type. Because of
this, they make contact with a larger finger over a large surface area.
Also, since Hunt-and-Peck typists are generally less skilled, they
take longer for each keystroke, resulting in longer contact time.
These two factors combined yield high-quality thermal residue for
Thermanator Attacks.
5.1.2 Secure Passwords. "Secure" passwords are more challeng-
ing to analyze. As shown in Figure 14 full recall was possible, on
average, up to 31 seconds after recording started, in the best case,
and 19.5 seconds, in the worst case. Performance of stage 2 subjects
was uniform in terms of password length: the shortest password
Figure 14: ID Rates for Hunt-and-Peck: "Secure" Passwords
was the easiest to analyze correctly. Anecdotally, this is not surpris-
ing. It was quite common for Hunt-and-Peck typists to look back
and forth between the characters of a relatively complex "secure"
passwords, and their keyboards. This resulted in longer comple-
tion times, which left longer time for keycaps to cool off before
recording began.
5.2 Touch Typists
Analyzing data from Touch typists was a challenge for stage 2 sub-
jects. Since a typical Touch typist’s fingers are constantly in contact
with (or in very close proximity of) the home-row of the keyboard,
there are two incidental sources of thermal noise. First, there is
thermal residue on the 2 groups of 4 home-row keys: "asdf" and
"jkl;" which results from the typist’s fingertips. However, whenever
typist’s ingers rest on the keyboard for a long time, additional ob-
served effects occur outside (though near) the home-row, on the
following keys:
"qwertgvcxz" on the left, "][poiuhnm,./" on the right
Even though this secondary thermal residue was not as drastic as
that on the home-row, it had a more pronounced effect on stage
2 subjects. In many cases, a subject was uncertain whether a key
was lit on the thermal image because it was actually pressed, or
because it was simply close to the home-row. This uncertainty in
turn led to mis-classification of some keys as unpressed. Also, mis-
classification of home-row keys as pressed keys was not counted
in the distance. We justify this choice in Section 6.
5.2.1 Insecure Passwords. While more difficult than analysis of
"insecure" password for Hunt-and-Peck typists, phase 2 subjects
has moderate success analyzing Touch typists entering "insecure"
passwords. As Figure 15 shows, the best average time for full recall
was for password: "12341234" at 47.6 seconds, and the worst was
for "jordan23", at 17.8 seconds. This follows the notion that stage 2
subjects were hesitant to classify home-row-adjacent key-presses,
e.g., "o", "r" and "n" in "jordan23". Furthermore, this supports the
notion that a simple, repeated password such as "12341234" leaves
ideal thermal residue. Since each key is repeated, it is analogous to
each key being pressed once for twice as long. This results in twice
7
Figure 15: ID Rates for Touch Typists: "Insecure" Passwords
as much thermal energy being transferred from the fingertip to the
keycap.
Figure 16: ID Rates for Touch Typists: "Secure" Passwords
5.2.2 Secure Passwords. Touch typists entering "secure" pass-
words were the most difficult for the stage 2 subjects to analyze. As
shown in Figure 16, full recall was only possible, on average, within
the first 14.33−−18.5 seconds. Surprisingly, the password with the
smallest window for full recall was "jxM#1CT[". We believe that
many phase 2 subjects were hesitant to classify home-row-adjacent
keys in this password as keystrokes (as opposed to thermal noise).
This might explain why the window for full recall is so small. As
with all other cases, the time window between full recall at d = 0
and a single mis-identification d = 1 was much greater than any
other window between d = n and d = n + 1, which is consistent
with Newton’s Law of Cooling.
5.3 Outlier: Acrylic Nails
There was a single Stage 1 subject that had long acrylic fingernails.
Instead of typing with fingertips, this person tapped the keys with
nail-tips. Since these do not have nearly as much surface area as
fingertips, and false nails do not have any blood vessels to regulate
their temperature, this subject left almost no thermal residue. In
fact, not a single key-press could be correctly identified in any of the
40 password entry trials. Consequently, this subject is not included
in either Touch or Hunt-and-Peck typist populations. However,
as a side curiosity, we note that, although it may be a rare occur-
rence, any user with long acrylic fingernails is virtually immune to
Thermanator Attacks.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we break down our observations from Section 5
between two password classes, and among two categories of typists.
6.1 Results with Common Passwords
Stage 2 subjects were particularly adept at identifying passwords
that are English words or phrases. Even though we could not re-
liably detect the exact sequence of pressed keys, ordering can be
found indirectly by mapping the set of pressed keys to words (essen-
tially, solving an anagram puzzle). Furthermore, a list of distances
between detected keys (characters) and possible words, can be used
to reconstruct full passwords from incomplete thermal residues..
Finally, the same list of distances can help determine when a key
is pressed multiple times. These combinations highlight the threat
posed by Thermanator Attacks to already insecure passwords.
6.2 Results with Random Passwords
However, strong results from Stage 2 subjects’ identification of
English-languagewords does not extend to secure, randomly-selected
passwords. First, inability to reliably determine the order of pressed
keys can not be mitigated by leveraging the underlying linguistic
structure. Moreover, it is unclear whether a given set of emanations
represents the whole password, or if some information was lost.
Finally, it is impossible to tell if a key was pressed multiple times.
However, even with these shortcomings, our subjects managed to
greatly reduce the password search space from 72n to 72n−m ∗m!
where n is the total number of characters in the password, andm is
the number of identified key-presses.
6.3 Results with Hunt-and-Peck Typists
Figure 17: Password "iloveyou" entered by a Hunt-and-Peck typist.
As described in Section 5.1, Hunt-and-Peck typists are partic-
ularly vulnerable to Thermanator Attacks. This is not surprising,
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given that these less-skilled typists tend to type more slowly, and
primarily use their index fingers, which have greater fingertip sur-
face area than ring or pinky fingers [18]. This results in greater
heat transfer, due to longer contact duration with a larger contact
area. Also, as seen from Figure 17, Hunt-and-Peck typists do not
touch any keys that are not part of the password. Therefore, every
observed key-press is part of the password.
6.4 Results with Touch Typists
Figure 18: Password "iloveyou" Entered by a Touch Typist.
For Touch typists, two factors confuse their thermal residues and
make passwords harder to harvest. One is their habit to rest their
hands on the home-row, which introduces potential false positives.
as Figure 18 shows. This is exacerbated by the possibility that any
home-row key might actually be part of the password. Because of
this, stage 2 subjects were not penalized for classifying the home-
row keys as pressed; they were instructed to identify all keys that
looked to them as having been pressed.
Another issue is that Touch typists tend to use all fingers of
both hands while typing. This causes two advantages over their
Hunt-and-Peck counterparts. First, they touch individual keys for a
shorter time, thus transferring less heat to the key-cap. Second, they
type much more quickly and also use their ring and pinky fingers.
Fingertips of these smaller fingers tend to have 1/2 of the surface
area of larger index or middle fingers. Thus, they transfer half of the
total heat energy due to conduction during a key-press [18]. Such
factors make Touch typists much more resistant to Thermanator
Attacks, particularly, at the level of our moderately sophisticated
adversarial model.
6.5 Ordering
Unfortunately, inspection of thermal images by stage 2 subjects did
not yield any reliable key-press ordering information. Newton’s
Law of Cooling might seem to indicate that any reduction in heat
energy would occur uniformly across all pressed keys, resulting
in exposure of ordering. However, this is not true in practice. One
reason is due to by keystroke inconsistency in the dynamics of Touch
typists. Factors, such as the travel distance between keys and the
particular finger used to press a key, result in small differences in
the duration, and total surface area of, contact. Since each key-press
is distinct, intensity of a given thermal residue does not correspond
to its relative position in the target password. This holds even for
Hunt-and-Peck typists, who tend to use only their index fingers. As
evidenced by Figure 19, Hunt-and-Peck typist does not necessarily
press keys with uniform force or for a uniform duration. These
inconsistencies make reliable ordering of key-presses infeasible in
our analysis framework. However, as mentioned above, for insecure
(language-based) passwords, dictionary tools can be used to infer
the most likely key-press order.
6.6 Mitigation Strategies
There are several simple strategies to mitigate or reduce the threat
of Thermanator Attacks, without modifying any existing hardware.
The most intuitive solution is to introduce Chaff typing right after
a password is entered. This can be as simple as asking the users
to swipe their hands along the keyboard after password entry, or
requiring them to introduce noise by typing arbitrary “chaff”. This
would serve to obscure the password by introducing useless ther-
mal residues, and thus make the password key-presses much more
difficult to retrieve. Another way is to avoid keyboard entry alto-
gether and use the mouse to select (click on) password characters
displayed on the on-screen keyboard. A variation is to have drop-
down menu for each position of the password and the user selects
each character individually. A more burdensome alternative is to
use the keyboard arrow keys to adjust a random character string
(displayed on the screen) to the actual password. All such methods
are well-known and are quite viable. However, they are more vul-
nerable to Shoulder-Surfing Attacks, due to the ease of watching
a victim’s larger, visible screen instead of their smaller, partially
occluded keyboard. Finally, a user who is willing to go to extreme
lengths to avoid leaving thermal residues could wear insulating
gloves or rubber thimblettes over their fingers during password
entry. This would greatly reduce thermal residues, and make Ther-
manator ineffective, since thermal conductivity of the insulating
material would be much less than that of human skin.
If hardware changes are possible, other mitigation techniques
might be appropriate. For example, a touch-screen would allow
password entry without the use of a keyboard. However, this would
be more (than keyboard entry) vulnerable to Shoulder-Surfing At-
tacks. Also, the use of touch-screens opens the door for attacks that
exploit smudge patterns left behind by fingers [4]. Alternatively,
common plastic keyboards could be replaced with metallic ones.
Metals have much higher thermal conductivity than plastics. Thus,
any localized thermal residues very quickly dissipate throughout
the keyboard. A similar strategy was adopted to protect ATMs from
thermal attacks [14].
7 COMPARISONWITH SIMILAR ATTACKS
We now compare Thermanator with several similar human factors-
based insider attacks. We focus on several aspects: adversary’s Goal,
any Required Equipment, the Timeliness requirements, whether a
Careless Victim is needed, and finally, if Prior Profiling of the victim
is required. Summary of the comparison is shown in Table 1.
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Figure 19: Password "passw0rd" thermal residue after 0(top left), 15 (top right), 30 (bottom left), and 45 (bottom right) seconds after entry
Table 1: Feature Comparison of Common Human-Based Attack Types.
Attack Attack Adversary Careless Equipment Prior Profiling
Type: Goal: Timeliness Victim? Needed: Required?
Lunch-Time Hijack 15 min (default) YES None NO
Log-in Session
Shoulder-Surfing Password Real-Time YES Pair of Eyes NO
or Video Camera
Acoustic Emanations Password Real-Time NO Audio YES
Recorder
Keyboard Vibrations Password Real-Time NO Accelerometer YES
Thermanator Password up to 1 min NO Thermal NO
Camera
7.1 Lunch-Time
Lunch-Time Attacks are performed by the insider adversary who
relies on a careless victim that neglects to terminate their secure
log-in session [22].
• Objective: to gain access to a single secure (authenticated)
session.
• Required Equipment: none, the adversary only needs to phys-
ically access the computer once the victim leaves.
• Timeliness: determined by the de-authentication technique(s)
used by the victim. For example, the default inactivity time-
out for Windows machines is a generous 15 minutes.
• Careless Victim: required for this attack to work. At the mini-
mum, the victim needs to leave their workstation unattended
without logging out or locking the screen.
• Profiling: no prior victim profiling is needed. The adversary
can be opportunistic; it gains access to an authenticated
session with out any additional or prior knowledge required.
7.2 Shoulder-Surfing
Shoulder-Surfing Attacks are performed by the insider adversary
who looks over the shoulder of a careless victim while the password
is entered. It can also be performedwith the aid of a (perhaps hidden)
camera pointed at the victim’s keyboard, in which case adversarial
presence is not required.
• Objective: to learn the victim’s password.
• Required Equipment: none, though a video camera can be
useful.
• Timeliness real-time, as the adversary must watch victim
password entry as it occurs.
• Careless Victim: required, since the adversary has to stand
over the victim’s terminal to watch them type in their pass-
word. Careless victim is not required in case of a pre-placed
viceoa camera.
• Profiling: no prior victim profiling is needed and the adver-
sary can be opportunistic: it learns the victim’s password
with no additional or prior knowledge.
10
7.3 Acoustic Emanations
Acoustic Emanations Attacks are performed by the insider adver-
sary who instruments the victim’s environment with an audio
recording device and exploits acoustic dynamics [28]
• Objective: learn the victim’s password.
• Required Equipment: an audio recording device, placed nearby.
• Timeliness: real-time, since the adversary must record the
keyboard sounds instantaneously.
• Careless Victim: not required; the recording device can be
hidden from view.
• Profiling: prior victim profiling is needed; the adversary must
build an acoustic profile of the victim to accurately interpret
keystroke sounds.
7.4 Keyboard Vibrations
Vibration Attacks are performed by the insider adversary using an
accelerometer to record vibrations created by a victim typing into
a keyboard, in order to reconstruct what was typed [12].
• Objective: learn the victim’s password.
• Required Equipment: an accelerometer, placed nearby (closer
than in Acoustic Emanations Attacks).
• Timeliness: real-time, since the adversary must record the
victim’s vibrations instantaneously.
• Careless Victim: not required; the recording device can be
hidden from view.
• Profiling: prior victim profiling is needed; the adversary must
build a vibration profile in order to accurately interpret key-
stroke vibration patterns.
7.5 Thermanator
Thermanator Attacks are performed by an insider adversary who
records thermal residues users after recent password entry.
• Objective: learn the victim’s password.
• Required Equipment: thermal camera.
• Timeliness: up to 1 minute, the adversary must record the
keyboard before thermal residues dissipate.
• Careless Victim: not required; recording/imaging takes place
after the victim leaves.
• Profiling: prior victim profiling not needed. The adversary
does not need any prior knowledge of the victim to analyze
thermal images (though it obviously helps, especially with
insecure passwords).
8 RELATEDWORK
Real-time attacks that target passwords (and countermeasures to
them) have been studied extensively in the literature. Many meth-
ods have been proposed to mitigate Shoulder-Surfing Attacks [6, 11,
25]. [3, 5, 27, 28] have shown that keyboard acoustic emanations
leak information about pressed keys. [10] investigated how typing
style (Hunt-and-Peck vs. Touch) influences keyboard acoustic ema-
nation attacks. As was recently shown, such attacks can be even
mounted remotely [8].
The earliest attempt to use a thermal camera was focused on
recovering key-codes entered into a rubber keypad of an industrial-
grade safe [26]. Although not much detail is provided, it is argued
that the attack can successfully yield key-codes up to 5−10minutes
after initial entry.
Androitis et al. [2] discuss using a thermal camera to infer screen-
lock patterns of smartphones. This study reports that screen-lock
patterns can be seen up to 3 seconds after entry when using a
cold just-booted smartphone. After a few seconds, it was no longer
possible to extract any information about screen-lock patterns. In
a similar effort, [1] conducted more extensive experiments with 18
users to assess efficacy of thermal imaging attacks against screen-
lock patterns. it was shown that PINs are vulnerable to such an
approach, while swipe-patterns are not.
Mowery et al. [14] investigated the influence of material com-
position (metal vs. plastic) and camera distance (14 vs. 28 inches)
on PIN recovery, using a US$17, 950 thermal camera, on commer-
cial PoS-style PIN pads. Results showed that metallic PIN pads are
not prone to password recovery since thermal residue dissipates
rapidly and metallic surfaces partially reflect thermal energy. For
plastic PIN pads, given a thermal camera placed 14 inches away,
80% of pressed keys were correctly identified immediately after
entry. Success rate dropped down to 60% and 40% after 30 and 60
seconds, respectively. Perfect code recovery at any time is rather
low: < 10%.
[23] discuss the effectiveness of a low-cost thermal camera (≈
US$330, attachable to a smartphone) to recover 4-digit PINs entered
into rubber keypads. Analysis shows that the camera’s distance
from the keypad is important: from 22.9 and 48.3 centimeters, 2.6
and 0.28 digits can be identified, respectively up to 20 seconds after
entry.
Finally, [24] discusses viability of thermal imaging attacks on
various PIN-entry devices. Analysis showed that the attack is a
credible threat. In addition, the study discusses how metallic sur-
faces can be conditioned to make thermal imaging attack successful.
Surface conditioning methods include: hair spray, stretch foil or
transparent nail polish. Nail polish was reported to be the best,
though success rates were not provided.
9 CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
As formerly niche sensing devices become less and less expensive,
new side-channel attacks move from "Mission: Impossible" towards
reality. This strongly motivates exploration of novel human-factors
attacks, such as those based on Thermanator. Work described in this
paper sheds some light on understanding the thermodynamic rela-
tionship between human fingers and external computer keyboards.
In particular, it exposes the vulnerability of standard password-
based systems to adversarial collection of thermal emanations.
Based on the results of our study, we believe that Thermanator
Attacks represent a new credible threat for password-based systems,
and that human-induced thermal side-channels deserve further
study. This is especially true considering the constantly decreasing
cost and increasing availability of high-quality thermal imagers. To
this end, we anticipate the following future work directions:
• Given marked differences in collectible data between Touch
and Hunt-and-Peck typists, one interesting next step is to
further refine our attack approach to handle expert typists
who introduce natural chaff through resting their hands on
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Figure 20: "jordan23", 5 seconds after entry, captured by TG165.
the keyboard home-row. Correct disambiguation of a home-
row key being a part of the password rather than thermal
noise, would be very helpful in limiting the password search
space.
• Another future direction is a longitudinal study to model
multiple instances of Thermanator Attacks, i.e., ,where the
adversary, over time, has several chances to obtain thermal
imaging data against the same victim. Our study only mea-
sured thermal residues from each subject once, per password
per keyboard. We hypothesize that a more persistent adver-
sary would be more successful and would be more likely
to recover the entire password after multiple Thermana-
tor instances. However, substantial further experiments are
needed to substantiate this claim.
• It would also be useful to investigate lowering the bar for
adversarial sophistication. Figure 20 shows an image of pass-
word “jordan23” entered by a Hunt-and-Peck typist, 5 sec-
onds after entry, as captured by the inexpensive FLIR TG165.
Specifications for this camera are detailed in Section 2.5. This
image suggests that, in the long run, even a less capable (in
terms of equipment) adversary may pose a credible threat.
• Finally, we intend to explore collected thermal data to find
ordering effects on typed passwords. Currently, we can not
correctly determine the sequence of pressed keys. However,
this is probably a limitation of our specific equipment and
not of the laws of thermodynamics. As shown in Section 2
although the rate of cooling slows downmarkedly as a hot ob-
ject approaches room temperature, there remains some heat
difference that can be observed by a sensitive tool. Perhaps if
we modify our approach to pick apart these differences, the
overall strength of Thermanator Attacks would be greatly
increased.
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